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Since the 1980s, the primary public health response to injecting drug use in the UK has been 
one of harm reduction. That is, reducing the harms associated with drug use without necessarily 
reducing consumption itself. Rooted in a post-Enlightenment idea of rationalism, interventions 
are premised on the rational individual who, given the right means, will choose to avoid harm. 
This lies in stark contrast to dominant addiction models that pervade popular images of the ‘out 
of control’ drug user, or worse, ‘junkie’. Whilst harm reduction has undoubtedly had vast 
successes, including challenging the otherwise pathologising and often stigmatising model of 
addiction, I argue that it has not gone far enough in addressing aspects of drug use that go 
beyond ‘rational’ and ‘human’ control. Drawing on my doctoral research with people who 
inject drugs, conducted in London, UK, this paper highlights the role of the injecting ‘event’, 
which far from being directed or controlled by a pre-defined individual or ‘body’ was 
composed by a fragile assemblage of bodies, human and nonhuman. Furthermore, in line with 
the ‘event’s’ heterogeneous and precarious make-up, multiple ways of ‘becoming’ through 
these events were possible. I look here at these ‘becomings’ as both stabilising and destabilising 
ways of being in the world, and argue that we need to pay closer attention to these events and 
what people are actually in the process of becoming in order to enact more accountable and 
‘response-able’ harm reduction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We assert our attachment to the species as if it were a matter of fact, a given. So much 
so that we construct a fundamental notion of Rights around the Human. But is it so? 
(Braidotti, 2013, p. 1) 
The privileged position of the Human is evident in Public Health, with its place in harm 
reduction being no exception. Indeed, much of harm reduction’s authority is based on a human 
right to health (Jürgens, Csete, Amon, Baral, & Beyrer, 2010). Exploring harm reduction’s 
past, present and potential future, this paper hopes to outline and disrupt a reliance on the 
human and where it may be limiting a more open approach to drug–body relations and their 
effects. Through participants’ narratives of injecting drugs, I aim to explore where the human 
unravels and new forms of relations and subjectivities come into being. Drawing on two 
concepts in particular – ‘the event’ and ‘becoming’ – I will highlight the many bodies, human 
and nonhuman, involved in injecting events, and the more-than-human bodies enacted, to the 
point that disentangling these oscillating processes becomes almost impossible. Following this 
disruption, I will then use the concepts of ‘contingency’ and ‘care’ to rebuild optimism in a 
harm reduction that no longer requires a bounded human, and instead strives to attune to these 
human and nonhuman processes, to reconfigure bodies in ‘healthier’ ways. 
 
HARM REDUCTION: A ‘RATIONAL’ DRUG POLICY AND ITS CRITIQUE 
At the First International Conference on the Reduction of Drug Related Harm, in Liverpool, 
UK, in 1990 (Erickson, Riley, Cheung, & O’Hare, 1997, p. 7), delegates called for drug policy 
with less moralism and more rationalism (O’Hare, Newcombe, Matthews, Buning, & Drucker, 
1991). In keeping with the new Public Health movement of the time, harm reduction activists 
called for the approach to be rooted in evidence (Erickson et al., 1997, p. 7). Indeed, the title 
of the book that emerged from the third conference on drug-related harm was entitled 
‘Psychoactive Drugs and Harm Reduction: From Faith to Science’ (Heather, Wodak, 
Nadelmann, & O’Hare, 1993, my emphasis). 
 Importantly for this paper, the rationalism of the approach has produced an anthropocentrism. 
It is widely felt that if people who use drugs are given the correct evidence-based information 
and equipment they will make rational decisions based on internal cost/benefit analyses to 
reduce the harms associated with their drug use (Rumbold, Kellehear, & Hamilton, 1998; for 
critiques, see Mugford, 1993; O’Malley & Valverde, 2004). As such, The Human Rights Act 
has been used increasingly to substantiate these aims (Ezard, 2001; Hathaway, 2001; Hunt, 
2004; Kerr, Wood, Betteridge, Lines, & Jürgens, 2004; Stevens, 2011), including specific calls 
for needle exchange programmes, opiate substitution treatment and, more recently, supervised 
injecting clinics and drug consumption rooms (e.g. Malinowska-Sempruch & Gallagher, 2004; 
Release, 2016; UNAIDS, 2015). Summed up in a review of the evidence on human rights 
abuses and vulnerability to HIV infection in The Lancet, Jürgens et al. (2010) states that a 
rights-based response to drug use must be taken.  
However, a focus on human rights as a productive recourse for harm reduction has not been 
accepted by all. Keane (2003) cautions us that ‘human rights may not be politically efficacious 
in the arena of drug use’ (p. 227). In fact, she argues, ‘they may work to reinforce a universal 
model of the “normal” sovereign individual [“at the core of what it is to be human”] that 
pathologises and marginalises drug users’ (2003, p. 228). Instead, drawing on Isabelle Stengers 
(with Olivier Ralet, 1997), Keane argues for an ‘ethical perspective based on open-ended 
debate, practices of freedom and a respect for difference’ (2003, p. 228). I will return to this 
important interjection towards the end of the paper, but, for now, it is important to note that 
Keane’s critique can be seen located in a wider counter-narrative concerned with how harm 
reduction could be perpetuating an individualising neoliberal agenda. For example, even as 
early as the third International Conference on the Reduction of Drug Related Harm, Mugford 
(1993) questioned the ‘naivety of “liberation”’ and ‘limits of “reason”’ (p. 31). Taking up a 
Foucauldian governmentality perspective, Mugford and other commentators in the social 
sciences criticise harm reduction policies and technologies for their disciplining effects 
(Bergschmidt, 2004; Bourgois, 2000; McLean, 2011; Miller, 2001; O’Malley & Valverde, 
2004). In response to this critique, a ‘social science for harm reduction’ seeks to account for 
the social, economic and political influences in people’s lives and decision-making (Rhodes, 
2009) using concepts such as ‘situated rationality’ and ‘risk environment’ (Rhodes, 2002; 
Rhodes, Singer, Bourgois, Friedman, & Strathdee, 2005).  
More recently, researchers have worked to dismantle the individualising tendencies of harm 
reduction even in its strategic and situated capacity (Moore & Fraser, 2006). Indeed, influenced 
by actor–network theory (ANT), and science and technology studies (STS) more broadly, the 
field has been said to be experiencing a ‘material turn’ (Duff, 2013; Seear & Moore, 2014). 
Ontologically, flatter conceptualisations of drug taking have emerged that seek to displace the 
‘drug taker’, traditionally at the heart of research and policy, with wider notions of agency and 
who/what acts. For example, notably, Suzanne Fraser and colleagues look at how drugs, bodies 
and services in different space–time produce new subjectivities (Fraser, 2006; Fraser & 
Valentine, 2008), substances (Fraser & Valentine, 2006), conditions and diseases (Fraser, 
2004; Fraser & Seear, 2011) and call for responses to be receptive to these collaborations and 
differences (Dwyer, Fraser, & Treloar, 2011; Fraser, Rance, & Treloar, 2016; Fraser, Treloar, 
Bryant, & Rhodes, 2014).  
Although some of these ‘posthuman’ interests are long-standing (e.g. Gomart & Hennion, 
1999), they are still not widespread or uncontroversial. Thus, I hope to help substantiate these 
trends in offering case examples from my research on injecting drug use to show: first, where 
the individual becomes undone; second, how other more-than-human formations emerge; and 




We believe in a world in which individuations are impersonal, and singularities are pre-
individual. (Deleuze, 2004, p. xix) 
Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy of transcendental empiricism underpins my approach to ‘the 
event’ and ‘becoming’ taken in this paper. For Deleuze, life does not start with forms or 
organisms but these differences are produced in the process of life. ‘The event’ speaks to these 
moments where individuations come into being. Where the rationalism of harm reduction is 
based on the anterior human, an events perspective is underpinned by a relational and 
processual ontology, with the human always caught in the ebbs and flows of becoming. Those 
researching within the sociology of drug use have utilised ‘the event’ predominantly through 
Bruno Latour (e.g. Demant, 2009; Dilkes-Frayne, 2014; Duff, 2012; Gomart & Hennion, 1999; 
Race, 2015), and less so, through Gabriel Tarde (Bøhling, 2014; Vargas, 2010), Alfred 
Whitehead (Race, 2014), and Deleuze (Duff, 2014; Malins, 2004).  
In Mike Michael’s reading of Mariam Fraser’s (2011) analysis of the ‘event’ at the intersections 
of STS and Deleuzian philosophy, he suggests there are two versions of the event at play: 
In one version, the event is characterized by a ‘being with’, where the constituents of 
the event ‘co-habit’ in the process of that event, interacting with, but not changing in 
relation to, one another. Alternatively, the event is marked by a ‘becoming-with’, where 
constituents themselves mutually change, or intra-act as Barad (2007) phrases it. (2015, 
p. 88)  
Where drug events have been traced according to ANT, attention is paid to ‘mediation’ (e.g. 
Demant, 2009; Dilkes-Frayne, 2014; Duff, 2012; Race, 2015), and the moments these relational 
activities occur. This is seen to shift attention from ‘who acts’ to ‘what occurs’ (Dilkes-Frayne, 
2014; Duff, 2016; Gomart & Hennion, 1999). For me, thinking with Deleuze shifts this focus 
to ‘what becomes’. So a new question arises in terms of ‘what becomings’ or ‘becoming-with 
drugs’ (Michael & Rosengarten, 2012) move through the event?  
The hyphen in ‘becoming-with drugs’ is important as it highlights that there are no pre-defined 
bodies – ‘the body’ or ‘drug’ – but these come to ‘matter’ (in its dual sense) in relation to each 
other. As Deleuze points out, ‘mixtures are in bodies, and in the depth of bodies’:  
A body penetrates another and coexists with it in all of its parts, like a drop of wine in 
the ocean, or fire in iron. [...] But what we mean by ‘to grow’, ‘to diminish’, ‘to become 
red’, ‘to become green’, ‘to cut’, and ‘to be cut’ etc. [...]. These are no longer states of 
affairs – mixtures deep inside bodies – but incorporeal events at the surface which are 
the results of these mixtures. The tree ‘greens’. (Deleuze, 1990, pp. 5–6)  
Using the infinitive form, Deleuze is distinguishing the event – ‘greening’ – from the tree and 
greenness. Therefore, as Stagoll points out, ‘the event is not a disruption of some continuous 
state, but rather the state is constituted by events “underlying” it that, when actualised, mark 
every moment of the state as a transformation’ (2010, p. 90). ‘Becoming’ moves through 
events, produced by and producing a connectivity in which participants express a certain 
‘becoming-together’ or (noted by Michael above) as Karen Barad (2007) says, ‘intra-action’. 
Where an ‘interaction’ suggests an encounter between two predefined bodies, an ‘intra-action’ 
acknowledges the relationality of those bodies that are pre-individually relational, so that, 
crucially for this paper, living singularly is always a product of multiplicity.  
 
AIMS AND METHODS 
The overarching aims of the PhD project drawn upon in this paper were to explore experiences 
and embodiments of injecting drug use that surpass cognitive, rational decision-making, whilst 
also complicating a dominant scientific narrative of addiction that erases much of the associated 
complexities. These aims have specific relevance to the current paper because as I explored 
these ‘a-rational’ (neither non-rational nor rational but simply otherwise to rational) accounts 
further, ‘the human’ subject started to dissipate, moving beyond its boundaries that proved 
porous, into the ‘outside’ and back in again. Participants described a unique exposure to the 
world as both painful and pleasurable: a discomfort or awkwardness with the ‘outside’ in 
experiences of being ‘on edge’, feeling that environments were ‘too close’ and/or ‘[sensorially] 
overloaded’, but also an unrivalled affinity with the ‘outside’ that made people feel ‘at one’, 
‘blissful’ and even like they were ‘floating on air’ – a truly dissipated state where boundaries 
between the outside and inside become almost entirely removed. 
Even though I employed mostly conventional ‘representational’ methods to address these aims, 
in the liveliness of the research, they took me in nonrepresentational directions, which de-
centred the subject, dislodged meaning-making and elided subject/object dualisms. These 
methods included interviews with 30 people who inject drugs, interviews with 10 managers 
and workers in two drug services, and a six-month placement in one of the services carrying 
out participant observation. Here, I draw mostly from the former interviews. These lasted 
approximately 1.5 hours and participants were reimbursed £15 for their time and travel costs. 
All participants identified as current injectors (having injected within the past four weeks), with 
the vast majority regularly injecting heroin and/or crack cocaine. I spoke to both men (n20) 
and women (n10), who were aged between 24 and 60 years, and from a range of social and 
ethnic backgrounds. Ethical approval was granted by the London School of Hygiene & 
Tropical Medicine Ethics Committee (ref. 7039) and the National Health Service Regional 
Ethics Committee (ref. 14/LO/0184).  
Through these methods, my attention was drawn away from the ‘individual’ and towards a 
relationality of bodies, including genetic, material (nonhuman), imaginary and even 
institutional bodies, and how these more-than-human bodies were enacted through these 
assemblages. As such, the primary unit of analysis shifted from the spoken word of the drug 
user to the drug-using event. These directions were particularly aided through the use of body 
mapping. Whilst body mapping has been used to describe a number of practices, from a trauma 
therapy tool (Crawford, 2010) to 3D computer imaging (Tarr & Thomas, 2011), it refers here 
to a creative drawing method.  
Participants were asked to draw their bodies in relation to how they felt before, during and after 
injecting drugs, and the people and things around them at the time. It was soon clear that rather 
than merely reflecting injecting experiences, the mapping process was actively involved in 
producing these realities – reorganising temporal patterns and bodily arrangements. Where 
talking in interviews largely forces events into a linear narrative, drawing allowed for alterative 
forms. Time, for instance, became rearranged topologically as spaces like the ‘crack house’ 
slowed time down. One participant said: ‘the “gouching” [relaxed intoxication] time depends 
on … if I’m with people in a crack house, I don’t really know them and that, then I can’t relax 
in there’. Such findings tie in with other explorations of drug contexts in which time and space 
are seen as co-constitutive (e.g. Bøhling, 2014; Duff, 2007, 2012; Farrugia, 2015; Fraser, 2006; 
Race, 2014). The drawings also rearranged the classic body with new boundaries drawn up 
between the inside and outside, where substances, for example, could be part of the inside (see 
Dennis, 2016b). Participants commented on an epidermal breakdown when they were drug-
free: ‘I’m a complete nervous wreck. I’ll be jumping everywhere’; ‘I don’t want to be in my 
own skin’. One participant expressed feelings of ‘disembodiment’, of not feeling in his own 
body. Consequently, in the mapping process, bodies got redrawn with substances as well as 
other materials. To use Lury and Wakeford’s (2012) heuristic, the body maps provided a 
‘device’ into these more-than-human worlds.  
Devices act as a hinge between concepts and practice, epistemology and ontology, the 
virtual and the actual, [and help us] to recognise that knowledge practices, technical 
artefacts and epistemic things are encoded in everyday and specialised technologies and 
assemblages in which agency is no longer the sole privilege of human actors. (Lury & 
Wakeford, 2012, p. 9) 
 Therefore, from my starting point with an interest in going beyond the ‘rational’, I was moved 
through the research process yet further away from these human processes to the point that the 
human started to make little sense. Far from controllable or rational, the injecting event was a 
fragile sociomaterial achievement, involving both human and nonhuman processes, where new 
more-than-human bodies were also made. The remainder of the paper will deal with these two 
key findings and how they disrupt and reorganise our approach to drugs that rely too heavily 
on a distinction between drugs, bodies and environments, and the rational/irrational drug user 
who ‘successfully’ or ‘unsuccessfully’ navigates this interaction. 
 
‘ON THE TILT’: THE INJECTING EVENT AS A FRAGILE ACHIEVEMENT 
I suppose it’s like having the worst hunger or anything and, or, you haven’t had a drink 
for days and then you get water, and it’s almost as if it could drop over at any minute, 
so you’re really thirsty, so it’s on the tilt, but if you get it then you’re replenished, but 
if you miss it then it’s on the floor. So it’s the same if you miss a hit. (Lucy)  
Lucy’s narrative and body map, which has also proved useful in highlighting the trigger 
assemblage that moved her towards using drugs (see Dennis, 2016a; body map republished 
with permission), is used here to describe the fragility of the injecting event itself. She uses the 
analogy of the tilting water glass to describe a situation in which the ‘success’ of injecting is 
beyond her control (‘could drop over at any minute’). Whether the injecting event comes 
together to enact ‘success’ – ‘then you’re replenished’ – or failure – ‘it’s on the floor’ – is, she 
goes on to explain, dependent on the precise coming together of a vast array of things, which 
she attempts to explore in her drawing (Figure 1).  
 Figure 1: Lucy’s body map 
 
In the picture (Figure 1), Lucy writes the words ‘long term use, success, wonderful’, by which 
to sum up a long discussion on the fragility of the injecting event. She makes clear to me that 
its ‘success’ is made up of several tentative bodies, body parts, substances, things, thoughts 
and words. Here, I look at the role of her hands, ‘boyfriend’, citric, blood, syringe and the 
techno-corporeal skills involved in keeping these connections together.  
Lucy draws two pairs of hands. She explains that her hands play a vital role in the injecting 
event as the only area where she is able/willing to find a vein. She also notes the role that her 
boyfriend plays in helping her to inject.  
Because I always had problems injecting myself, I found it easier for him to do it for 
me. It was weird. I could do everything, but from that perspective, I had more luck if 
he was doing it […] It’s almost like a wasted skill. He really should be in the profession 
of nursing, or something. 
‘Blood’ is also prominently written in the body map, and is said to be a key actor in the 
‘success’ of the injecting event. That is, she explains, a flush of blood in the syringe lets Lucy 
know that the needle is in the vein so the syringe can be plunged and its load released. The 
itchiness of the citric acid is similarly noted in the picture, which she uses to dissolve the heroin 
into an injectable solution. Although it is uncomfortable, it is necessary for indicating that the 
mixture has gone into the vein, without which she would be unsure and not fully able to enjoy 
it.  
Citric gives an itchy sensation, but you know when you get this itchy, it’s weird, it’s 
actually uncomfortable, but you know that you’ve had a successful hit. Even if you go, 
‘oh itchy, I need to go and wash my hand’, it’s like intense pins and needles, you know 
that the citric has gone in, it’s gone in, it’s worked, so you know that soon after you’re 
starting to do that (nod off). Even though you’re annoyed, it’s a horrible itchy feeling, 
because it’s the citric going into your veins. With Vitamin C, it’s less itchy, but what 
I’ve noticed with the itchy feeling is the success. It always means it’s pulled well, it 
hasn’t hurt and it’s worked, so success. So ‘itchy, success’, and then I’d go to water cos 
I’d wash my hands because they feel itchy but then ‘success’, so I’m smiling.  
The citric disrupts any clear sense of boundaries between the ‘real’ (ontological) and ‘known’ 
(epistemological) event. It acts to both constitute and know the ‘success’ as inextricably bound. 
The drugs, heroin and crack cocaine, are also drawn (in brown, centre), but perhaps in a less 
marked way than the syringe (in red, centre-left), or cooker (in green, centre-left). I highlight 
these substances and ‘things’ here to show the many nonhuman bodies involved in the injecting 
event that get noticed through these drawings.  
Moreover, the body mapping captured a sense of muddle and uncertainty in the event, where 
things seem to suddenly come together (or, as one participant put it, ‘it will just happen’), but 
can just as easily shift, and fall apart (or ‘drop over’ as Lucy puts it above). Highlighting this 
fragility further, Lucy says ‘there’s this 50/50 if it’s going to work: 50 heaven/50 hell’. 
However, this is not to suggest a lack of agency, just a different kind. Following Annemarie 
Mol:  
Once it is singled out as a topic of study, even undergoing appears to have little to do 
with being passive. It is hard work. Ask amateurs – of music, of drugs, of wine – and 
follow what they do in practice. They do a lot: their pleasure depends on preparations. 
(Mol, 2010, p. 256, my emphasis)  
The collaborative ‘success’ of the injection is based on a finely attuned balancing act of bodies, 
so to assume Lucy and other participants a hierarchically more active role than their nonhuman 
partners (mastery over their tools/environment) would be to underplay their coproduction. 
Accordingly, the ‘success’ of the injecting event was permanently at risk or ‘on the tilt’ and 
required, to extend Lucy’s metaphor, constant work to ‘keep it upright’.  
One participant, Simon, illuminates some of this work.  
Now, what I tend to do. It has to be when I’m ... it’d have to be in the evening. I will 
have to have eaten. I’d have to have had a few drinks to relax me, definitely will have 
to have eaten. I mean, you know, I used to do it in the morning before I’d even woken 
up kind of thing, you know what I mean, so I would have had no blood pressure what 
so ever. But because my veins were so good it would still work. Now that, no way, it 
has to be the whole thing of hot water, do the washing up, make sure I’ve eaten and you 
can see the little tiny marks. So what it is now, is that I’ll see a tiny little one, or I’ll just 
do it by feeling, you just rub very, very, very gently, rubbing your hand around like that 
(rubs his hand delicately), and I’ll just feel something that gives a little bit and I know 
that’s a vein.  
The timings for when Simon injects are important. It has to be in the evening. He has to have 
had something to eat and drink. He has to increase his heart rate to raise a vein. Other 
participants talked about exercising, such as fast cycling, to stimulate the venal system. Simon 
also mentions ‘the whole thing of hot water’, that is, he explains, he does the washing-up so 
that the hot water and activity helps a vein to swell and make itself visible and viable. He then 
performs the delicate operation of feeling his hand for a slight change in texture and give in a 
vein which indicates there is blood and the vein is large enough to hold the needle steady 
without piercing through the other side causing a ‘miss hit’. The success of the injection is 
reliant on all these practices – to make something happen, or ‘occur’, to use Gomart and 
Hennion’s (1999) term. But where Gomart and Hennion suggest a ‘passing’ – what might be 
called ‘mediation’ in other ANT accounts of drug use – between ‘subjects and objects’, ‘control 
and loss of control’, ‘the body and the head’, I feel this is incongruent with the shared agencies 
expressed here, where the divisions were never so clear cut and the points of seizure were 
already co-produced. In other words, the connections shown above were only ever partial, in a 
process of ‘staying upright’. Or, to follow Deleuze (1993), the event is only ever ‘happening’.  
In this sense, whether, how, and to what ends an injection of heroin and/or crack cocaine has 
an effect was far from chosen. With the individual entangled in the event, it depended on the 
coming together of an assembly of heterogeneous bodies, human and nonhuman, made possible 
through an equally complicated set of techno-corporeal preparatory practices. Thus, 
participants expressed an intra-corporeality, that is, an emergent embodiment of human and 
nonhuman processes. This is perhaps also where the events perspective most departs from 
earlier attempts to go beyond the individual in notions of the ‘risk environment’ (noted in the 
introduction). Where the ‘risk environment’ takes contextual 
influences seriously through an appreciation of how social, economic, political and discursive 
structures interact with the human subject to result in harmful consequences, here, in 
reconfiguring the boundaries between the subject and object, inside and outside, and body and 
environment, I want to think about how the ‘human’ body itself comes into being through these 
injecting events. That is, how the injecting event produces more than affects and effects (‘what 
occurs’) as pleasurable, in coming together in ‘successful’ ways, and painful, in coming 
together in unsuccessful ways, but also the ways it produces new bodies (‘what becomes’). 
  
BECOMING-WITH DRUGS 
The posthuman condition urges us to think critically and creatively about who and what 
we are actually in the process of becoming. (Braidotti, 2013, p. 12)  
So far, I have highlighted the injecting event as a fragile modality of connection, which goes 
beyond any one controlling or agentic component, instead, held together through a complex 
collaborative effort. This disrupts previous accounts of the rational individual in harm reduction 
and in other areas of sociology where, for example, the ‘controlled loss of control’ model has 
been prominent (see Poulsen, 2015). On the other hand, it also unsettles addiction narratives 
that centre on the power of the controlling, disempowering drug. In extending this account of 
the injecting event, I want to consider the various ways participants depict ‘becoming-with 
drugs’ (Michael & Rosengarten, 2012), which shifts corporeal boundaries yet further.  
These points of transformation were felt both as stabilising (in becoming-normal, see Dennis, 
2016b) and changing the self (in becoming-other). However, there is a fine line between the 
two as both are underpinned by process, that is, ‘stabilising’ should not be confused with 
anything static. This sociomaterial performativity is captured by one participant who says ‘a 
lot of people want the up, the buzz as well, as lots of people go to work, working, living 
relatively normal lives, y’know, they have things to keep together’. Beyond the event itself, 
drugs can be seen here to play a wider role in ‘keeping things together’. This is also described 
by another participant, Sandra, who depicts (Figure 2) the role of injecting heroin in enabling 
‘functioning for the rest of the day’, ‘shopping’, and ‘daily life’.  
Sandra, who was 48 years old, and had been injecting heroin on and off for the past 25 years, 
spoke of how, like her friend Gwen (who I also spoke to), injecting heroin played an important 




Figure 2. Sandra’s body map 
 
 
What happened is, me and Gwen both got the same thing, we’ve got COPD [Chronic 
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease], so we can’t breathe without gear [heroin], it 
suppresses your breathing which really helps. We can’t breathe without the gear. And 
also, I’ve got a degenerative back problem so I can’t walk without it. I could not walk. 
I couldn’t walk at all. 
Gwen too tells me how heroin helps her to feel better. Or to appropriate Cameron Duff’s 
Deleuzian notion of health, to become healthier. For Duff (2014), health is defined by one’s 
capacity to affect and be affected, or ‘power of acting’. Health, Duff says, ‘may be understood 
to involve those forms of bodily activity that extend a body’s range of action’ (2014, p. 75). 
Drugs therefore, for some, in some instances, may contribute towards this power, which 
disrupts a dominant discourse on harm.  
At the moment I’m happy to carry on because I’m not very well anyway and it helps 
me. It helps me through the day, I can admit that I actually like doing it, because I’m 
having a miserable life with my illnesses. I’ve got Crohn’s disease and the thing about 
Crohn’s disease is that you have constant diarrhoea and pain, heroin and morphine 
constipates you so it stops the diarrhoea so I’m actually using it medicinally as well. 
They say that ‘if we could prescribe you morphine for your condition we would but 
we’re not allowed to’. (Gwen)  
Furthermore, as Gwen hints to, in admitting ‘I actually like doing it’, becoming-with drugs 
does not only bring bodies together in a stabilising, normalising, or health-giving ways, but for 
some participants was intimately involved in enhancing life or becoming somebody else. For 
example, participants talked about how drugs enabled them to become friendlier, more 
energetic, tolerant, and sociable. To this effect, Dimitri says:  
My mates say, when I haven’t had nothing I’m quiet, and then as soon as I’ve had 
something I’m completely changed, my mood’s like up, and I’m taking the piss and 
everything like that, complete, like you can spot it, you can, the complete change is like 
yeah, totally different.  
Another participant depicted this change of self in drawing a picture of herself as superwoman, 
overtly signalling the role of drugs in making her into something more-than-human, with, she 
says, enhanced energy and tolerance of others.  
However, as Peta Malins warns, through a reading of Deleuze’s assemblage:  
Within each drug assemblage, the body connects up not only to the drug (its texture, its 
smell, its taste, its appearance, its speed) but also to other bodies and machines – people, 
substances, knowledges, institutions – any of which may redirect or block its flows of 
desire. (2004, p. 89) 
 Therefore, becoming-with drugs was not only life sustaining and enhancing, but could also be 
constraining or containing, in particular, when connecting with bodies that have ‘stratifying 
tendencies’. In Deleuze and Guattari’s words:  
Strata are Layers, Belts. They consist of giving form to matters, or imprisoning 
intensities or locking singularities into systems of resonance and redundancy, of 
producing upon the body of the earth molecules large and small and organising them 
into molar aggregates. (2004, p. 45)  
Participants give vivid accounts of how, in being linked up to, to use Malins’s phrase, the 
‘junkie image’, and the syringe, especially, they were constrained in these ways: prevented 
from becoming ‘legitimate’, ‘worthy’ or ‘trusted’ patients, friends, daughters, employees, 
customers etc. These shifts in boundaries get exemplified in Lucy’s recount of an incident in 
which her boyfriend’s step-mother found their disused syringes. He ‘was wacked around the 
face’ and ‘we were told that we should have labels put on us saying that we’re dirty junkies’. 
As these connections to the syringe were not visible, the step-mother, in her rage, demands that 
they should where a sign to literally transfix or ‘lock’ (to use Deleuze & Guattari’s words 
above) the ‘junkie’ identity and block other ways of becoming, such as, one can guess, being 
able to walk down the street unnoticed, get a job, etc.  
Through this analysis, it appears that drugs do not have innate qualities but can be part of good 
and bad encounters (Keane, 2003) as bodily boundaries shift capacities to affect and be 
affected. That is, ‘good’ when linked up with bodies to become ‘healthier’ or somehow better 
than themselves (increasing capacities to act), and ‘bad’ when linked to bodies with stratifying 
tendencies, which tie bodies down and constrain them (decreasing capacities to act). In 
prioritising the event over forms or bodies as given, that is, in considering how bodily forms 
come into being through the event – in connecting to other bodies – harm reduction is required 
to shift its focus beyond the human. Where a ‘social science for harm reduction’ has already 
been influential in decentring ‘the individual’ with the ‘situated individual’ and ‘risk 
environment’, the analysis here suggests a further step is needed towards what could be 
considered individuals-as-situations. 
 
HARM REDUCTION BEYOND THE HUMAN: WHAT DOES THIS LOOK LIKE IN 
PRACTICE? 
In moving away from ‘the human’ towards becoming through events we can start to think about 
harm reduction in more open ways. I will now think about what this might look like in practice. 
First, as we have seen, ‘events’ are uncertain, fragile and precarious, and thus they invoke a 
need for contingency over fixed solutions based on causes and effects. Indeed, rigid policies 
and interventions could be ‘blocking’ rather than enabling ways of becoming-other. Second, 
by understanding subject formation as ‘event-full’, this requires ‘response-ability’ (Barad, 
2012; Haraway, 2008) in research and policy to attend to and bring into being more careful 
forms (Martin, Myers, & Viseu, 2015; Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011). We must learn to attune to 
these different forms and what they can tell us about the world, as well as being accountable 
for what gets made, in order to bring bodies together in ‘healthier’ ways.  
A call for contingency in drug treatment policy and practice is arguably already one of harm 
reduction’s biggest strengths. As we saw in the abstract, harm reduction is built on accepting 
that people will use drugs (accepting these attachments, if you like) and, rather than judging or 
moralising, working with these encounters to make them as safe as possible. Inspired by a 
notion of contingency, we can take these insights even further towards the level of relationality 
seen here, and the role of drug research and intervention in bringing about relationalities of 
new kinds. Drawing from Sara Ahmed:  
The word ‘contingency’ has the same root in Latin as the word ‘contact’ (Latin: 
contingere: com-, with; tangere, to touch). Contingency is linked then to proximity, to 
getting close enough to touch another and to be moved by another. (2004, p. 28)  
Contingency incites an awareness to our existence in terms of the outside within as seen in the 
accounts of drug-body relations. Therefore, in light of the event, it is perhaps no surprise that 
when I asked one participant, Mya, about why she continued using drugs, she replied:  
And the way of life. You know, how can I get a methadone script when I’m not living 
nowhere, how can I get a doctor when I can’t give no address. From when you’re 
homeless, everything is against you. You can’t get a doctor, you can’t get a prescription, 
there’s no way out. So you just go deeper and deeper into it. 
It is not only in connection to drugs that she goes ‘deeper and deeper into it’ or experiences 
addiction (blocked ways of becoming-other) but in these connections with other bodies – ‘the 
way of life’ – including the legal system, institutions, knowledges and policies, which means 
she has no housing, doctor or prescription for an opiate substitute. Therefore, drug treatment 
systems that make it harder for contingency, that resist relationality or fail to be ‘in touch’, like 
making it difficult to access methadone outside ‘working hours’, could actually be blocking 
ways of becoming-other.  
As well as contingency being needed within the administration of opiate substitution treatment 
(e.g. Fraser & Valentine, 2008; Harris & Rhodes, 2013), like other harm reduction technologies 
(e.g. Bourgois, 2000), for many participants, contingency was also required in the substances 
or technologies themselves. For Tom, buprenorphine, an opiate agonist and antagonist, did not 
have such contingency. Instead, where the agonist component or ‘blocker’ failed and he ‘found’ 
(a word that emphasises the workings of an event rather than an individual) himself using 
heroin ‘on top’ of his prescription he entered into precipitated withdrawals.  
Years ago I had terrible troubles with Subutex (brand name for buprenorphine). I sort 
of went to get clean, got down to about 10 mil of methadone and then went onto 
buprenorphine cos it’s got the blocker [antagonist] in it supposedly […] But I found the 
transition horrible, and then I found out that the blocker only works for about 4 hours 
so then, when I found myself using on top, I found it fucking murder. Switching to 
buprenorphine, I found it really hard. It just ended up being a waste of a script. I think 
methadone is much easier.  
For Tom, methadone, an opiate agonist, allowed for these moments when the drug assemblage 
might take him, where buprenorphine could not (‘you couldn’t use on top’), meaning that when 
he did, the script ‘ended up being a waste’, and he went back to exclusively using heroin. For 
Tom, methadone has more contingency, it is more ‘in-touch’ with these assemblic moments, 
or sudden eventful coming togethers of bodies in which he ‘found [himself] using’. This adds 
weight to similar calls for ‘convenience’ in harm reduction (Fraser, 2013).  
Therefore, to return to Keane’s (2003) reading of Stengers mentioned at the beginning, ‘rather 
than promoting [human] freedom as a moral principle or universal ideal’, Keane ‘focuses 
attention on the effect of different programmes and campaigns on individuals’ capacity for 
freedom and ethical self-formation’ (p. 231). This can be seen to move the ethics of harm 
reduction as a matter of fact – based on the human – to what Latour (2004) would call a ‘matter 
of concern’ – where what constitutes harm (impingements to freedom and self-formation) is 
open to iterative debate and different programmes. Critical attention is shifted from the 
principle of the programme to its effects or ‘what occurs’.  
However, thinking about how bodies become through events perhaps turns harm reduction 
research and practice as a ‘matter of concern’, or matter of ‘what occurs’, made up of a 
negotiated apparatus beyond the human, into what Puig de la Bellacasa (2011) calls a ‘matter 
of care’, or what I have suggested can be seen as an added concern for ‘what becomes’. ‘We 
must take care of things in order to remain responsible for their becomings’ (Puig de la 
Bellacasa, 2011, p. 90), and therefore we must be accountable for what gets made in research 
and practice alike, and the bodily boundaries we inevitably bring into being. As seen here, in 
opening up boundaries beyond the human, we can account for the many ways, including 
positive ways bodies become-with drugs.  
I have suggested that one way care might be brought into our research is through the notion of 
‘touch’. Ahmed and Barad, like Puig de la Bellacasa, all draw on ‘touch’ to stress these 
collective ways of knowing and engaging with the world – to touch and ‘to be in touch’ is to 
be attuned and responsive to these different forms. For example, many drug worker accounts 
highlighted the need for ‘intuition’ and ‘creativity’ over protocol in order to cope with the 
multiple ways bodies become through injecting or drug events and thus the different ways to 
make them ‘healthier’, to use Duff’s notion. For some participants, like Gwen, Sandra and 
Mya, this may include the continued use of opiates. Therefore, instead of favouring 
increasingly punitive measures (e.g. Wintour, 2015), based on assumed effects of drugs as bad, 
we need to increase awareness, tolerance and responsiveness to the event in order to learn from 
and be part of making bodies in new and better ways.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The ethical imagination is alive and well in posthuman subjects, in the form of 
ontological relationality. A sustainable ethics for non-unitary subjects rests on an 
enlarged sense of inter-connection between self and others, including the non-human. 
(Braidotti, 2013, p. 190) 
Responding to shifts within the social sciences of drug use, this paper has tried to move us yet 
further away from the human or individual, that is, even in its strategic or situated forms, 
towards what arepotentially more ethical posthuman injecting or drug-using collectives. By 
exploring injecting events as connections of bodies, substances, images and things in 
participants’ accounts of becoming-with drugs, not only is the heterogeneity and fragility of 
the event highlighted, but also what participants are actually in the process of becoming. Where 
some injecting events enabled positively felt experiences and subjectivities, other events – 
connecting with bodies with stratifying tendencies such as the syringe – materialised in 
negative ways, blocking ways of becoming-other. Indeed, drug treatment services were 
sometimes part of these formations. This calls for a more ‘response-able’ approach to drug use. 
To appropriate Puig de la Bellacasa words, we need to be aware and care for these events in 
order ‘to remain responsible for their becomings’. Consequently, I argue that two such 
possibilities for a harm reduction in light of our posthumanism lie in the practices of 
contingency and care. Building contingency into our technologies and practices means we can 
allow for the ambiguities, differences and uncertainties intrinsic to the complexities of drug 
events and what becomes. In caring, we must act to increase our capacities to be affected by 
these events, to be part of increasing good affects (‘power of acting’ in becoming-other), as 
well as decreasing the potential for bad affects (blocked becomings). It is in this sense that we, 
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